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THE PERMISSIBILITY OF IMPEACHING AN ALIBI WITNESS
WITH EVIDENCE OF HIS PRE-TRIAL SILENCE: THE NEW
YORK COURT OF APPEALS DECISION IN PEOPLE V.
DA WSONt
INTRODUCTION
Problems concerning the admissibility of pre-trial silence for
impeachment purposes at trial usually focus on the election of a
defendant to remain silent after his arrest.' This comment will,
however, consider the issue of whether an alibi witness' pre-trial
silence should be admissible at trial in order to impeach his testi-
mony. Analysis of this issue will center around the recent New
York Court of Appeals decision in People v. Dawson.2
While some of the same concerns involved in evaluating the
pre-trial silence of a defendant are also involved in analyzing an
alibi witness' pre-trial silence, there is one fundamental difference
between the two types of silence. The Fifth Amendment protects a
defendant from having his pre-trial silence used against him at
trial.' This Fifth Amendment protection, personal in nature and
capable of being asserted only by the defendant,4 was the basis of
t 50 N.Y.2d 311, 406 N.E.2d 771, 428 N.Y.S.2d 914 (1980).
1. At the outset it should be noted that the prosecution may not use evidence of a
defendant's post-arrest/pre-trial silence to support an inference of guilt. While the issue has
never been addressed by the Supreme Court, the holdings of the lower federal courts have
consistently supporLed this view. See, e.g., United States v. Bridwell, 583 F.2d 1135 (10th
Cir. 1978); United States v. Impson, 531 F.2d 274 (5th Cir. 1976), rehearing denied, 535
F.2d 186 (1976); United States v. Ghiz, 491 F.2d 599 (4th Cir. 1974); United States v. Moore,
484 F.2d 1284 (4th Cir. 1973); United States v. Faulkenbery, 472 F.2d 879 (9th Cir. 1973),
cert. denied, 411 U.S. 970 (1973); United States v. Kraslack, 426 F.2d 1129 (7th Cir. 1970).
2. 50 N.Y.2d 311, 406 N.E.2d 771, 428 N.Y.S.2d 914 (1980).
3. Support for this assertion can be found in the landmark Supreme Court decision,
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
In accord with our decision today, it is impermissible to penalize an individual
for exercising his Fifth Amendment privilege when he is under police custodial
interrogation. The prosecution may not, therefore, use at trial the fact that he
stood mute or claimed his privilege in the face of accusation.
Id. at 468 n.37. It should be noted that this statement is clearly dictum.
4. It would, of course, be preposterous for anyone other than a defendant to claim for
himself the protection afforded by the Fifth Amendment. The privilege is one against self-
incrimination.
The right of a person under the Fifth Amendment to refuse to incriminate him-
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the Supreme Court's holding in Doyle v. Ohio.5
In Doyle, two defendants were arrested for purportedly selling
ten pounds of marijuana to a police informant.6 At trial the defen-
dants claimed that they had been the victims of a "frame up." The
prosecution attempted to discredit the defendants' explanation of
what happened by cross-examining them with regard to their fail-
ure to relate their version to the arresting narcotics officers at the
time of arrest. The Supreme Court held that the assurance that
defendant's silence will not be used against him at trial is implicit
in the post arrest warnings mandated by Miranda v. Arizona.7 The
Doyle Court found the burdening of the exercise of the defendant's
Fifth Amendment rights to be fundamentally unfair and, hence, a
violation of due process.9 While the due process clause of the Fifth
Amendment protects the defendant from having his own pre-trial
silence used against him to impeach his testimony at trial, this
protection can not be extended to exclude the impeachment of an
alibi witness with evidence of his pre-trial silence since the witness'
personal Fifth Amendment rights are not similarly burdened.10
However, some of the evidentiary concerns present in the
cases dealing with the impeachment of a defendant through the
self is purely a personal privilege of the witness. It was never intended to permit
him to plead the fact that some third person might be incriminated by his testi-
mony, even though he [was] the agent of such person.
Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43, 69-70 (1906). See also Couch v. United States, 409 U.S. 322
(1973); Grunewald v. United States, 353 U.S. 391 (1957); Rogers v. United States, 340 U.S.
367 (1951).
5. Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610 (1976).
6. Id. at 611-13.
7. 384 U.S. 436, 467-73 (1966).
8. The defendant is burdened in the sense that by exercising his right to remain silent
he takes the chance that evidence of his silence might later be used to impeach his exculpa-
tory testimony at trial.
9. "Essential fairness is a fundamental due process requirement in criminal prosecu-
tions .... " United States v. Parish, 468 F.2d 1129, 1133 (D.C. Cir. 1972). See also Patter-
son v. New York, 432 U.S. 197, 201-202 (1977); Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 523 (1958)
(due process proscribes state procedure which "offends some principle of justice so rooted in
the traditions and conscience of our people to be ranked as fundamental"); Klimas v. Ma-
bry, 599 F.2d 842, 848 (8th Cir. 1979) (state's failure to "afford a particular defendant the
benefit of established procedures . . . may . . . result in a denial of due process when the
error made by the state court renders the state proceedings so fundamentally unfair . . . or
deficient that they are inconsistent with the rudimentary demands of fair procedure").
10. The witness is not "burdened" in the same sense as is a defendant, since a witness,
other than an actual or potential defendant, has no "right" to remain silent. See note 8
supra.
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use of his pre-trial silence are also applicable to the impeachment
of an alibi witness. In Doyle the Court stressed that the probative
value of a defendant's pre-trial silence was often minimal while its
potential for prejudicing the jury against the defendant could be
substantial. A defendant's silence after receiving his Miranda
rights might be nothing more than his exercise of those rights.
"Thus, every post arrest silence is insolubly ambiguous because of
what the State is required to advise the person arrested."11 In
United States v. Hale,12 decided one year prior to Doyle, these evi-
dentiary concerns, not the due process rationale of Doyle, were the
principal basis for the Court's refusal to allow evidence of the de-
fendant's pre-trial silence to be used at trial to impeach his excul-
patory testimony. In both of these cases the Supreme Court was
concerned with the jury placing too much weight on the defen-
dant's silence in light of its often insignificant probative value.
1 3
Hale emphasizes that the probative value of a defendant's si-
lence is, to a great extent, dependent upon the reasons for such
silence. Where many alternative explanations for the defendant's
pre-trial silence exist, the probativeness of that silence is minimal.
It is possible to substitute an alibi witness into this evidentiary
framework to determine whether the probative value of his silence,
discounted to some extent by his explanations for it, 14 is sufficient
to outweigh the prejudicial effect that its introduction will have on
the defendant.15 Thus, even though Doyle's per se exclusion of the
11. 426 U.S. at 617.
12. 422 U.S. at 171 (1975). The basis of the Court's decision in Hale was its supervisory
power over the lower federal courts. Id. at 181.
13. In Hale the Court stated:
[N]ot only is evidence of silence at the time of arrest generally not very pro-
bative of a defendant's credibility, but it also has a significant potential for
prejudice. The danger is that the jury is likely to assign much more weight to the
defendant's previous silence than is warranted. And permitting the defendant to
explain reasons for his silence is unlikely to overcome the strong negative infer-
ence that the jury is likely to draw from the fact that the defendant remained
silent at the time of his arrest.
Id. at 180. For a further discussion of both the Doyle and Hale opinions, see Comment,
Impeaching a Defendant's Testimony by Proof of Post-Arrest Silence: Doyle v. Ohio, 25
CLEV. ST. L. REV. 261 (1976).
14. Discounted in the sense that plausible explanations by the witness for his prior
silence will tend to show the truthfulness of his testimony and generally lessen the probative
value of his silence for impeachment purposes.
15. The prejudicial effect can be described as follows: the prosecution infers that the
witness is lying because of his failure to come forward prior to trial; the jury may then
1981] 225
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defendant's pre-trial silence has made the evidentiary inquiry of
Hale inconsequential with respect to a defendant, Hale now serves
as a valuable guide in making determinations regarding the admis-
sibility of a witness' pre-trial silence.
16
I. BACKGROUND TO THE COURT OF APPEALS DECISION IN
People v. Dawson
The issue of whether a prosecutor may cross-examine an alibi
witness with regard to his failure to come forward and disclose
what he knows to the authorities prior to trial has been frequently
litigated in New York over the past four years.17 Prior to Dawson,
the issue was decided both ways. Generally, the First and Fourth
Departments of the Appellate Division allowed a prosecutor to im-
peach the credibility of an alibi witness through questioning about
his failure to disclose alibi information to the authorities,18 while
believe that the defense has concocted an alibi to hide the defendant's guilt. Thus, the de-
fendant is the party who is ultimately punished for the witness' silence. See also FEn. R.
EvID. 403:
Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substan-
tially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or
misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or need-
less presentation of cumulative evidence.
New York has adopted this rule verbatim in its Proposed Code of Evidence (Rule 403).
16. This framework was employed by the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals in United
States v. Rubin, 559 F.2d 975, 981 (1977), to evaluate the pre-trial silence of a co-defendant.
17. See, e.g., People v. Phillips, 75 A.D.2d 735, 427 N.Y.S.2d 425 (lst Dep't 1980); Peo-
ple v. Sowell, 75 A.D.2d 608, 426 N.Y.S.2d 828 (2nd Dep't 1980); People v. Allen, 74 A.D.2d
640, 425 N.Y.S.2d 144 (2nd Dep't 1980); People v. Sharp, 71 A.D.2d 1034, 420 N.Y.S.2d 396
(2nd Dep't 1979); People v. Mason, 71 A.D.2d 961, 420 N.Y.S.2d 18 (2nd Dep't 1979); Peo-
ple v. Knox, 71 A.D.2d 41, 421 N.Y.S.2d 992 (4th Dep't 1979); People v. Nolasco, 70 A.D.2d
549, 416 N.Y.S.2d 610 (1st Dep't 1979); People v. Burgos, 69 A.D.2d 783, 415 N.Y.S.2d 219
(1st Dep't 1979); People v. Colarco, 68 A.D.2d 430, 417 N.Y.S.2d 681 (1st Dep't 1979); Peo-
ple v. Butler, 67 A.D.2d 950, 413 N.Y.S.2d 219 (2nd Dep't 1979); People v. Keller, 67 A.D.2d
153, 415 N.Y.S.2d 529 (4th Dep't 1979); People v. Maschi, 65 A.D.2d 405, 411 N.Y.S.2d 298
(1st Dep't 1978); People v. Dale, 65 A.D.2d 625, 409 N.Y.S.2d 525 (2nd Dep't 1978); People
v. Clark, 64 A.D.2d 669, 407 N.Y.S.2d 236 (2nd Dep't 1978); People v. Altman, 63 A.D.2d
684, 404 N.Y.S.2d 663 (2nd Dep't 1978); People v. Brown, 62 A.D.2d 715, 405 N.Y.S.2d 691
(1st Dep't 1978) aff'd 48 N.Y.2d 921, 401 N.E.2d 177, 425 N.Y.S.2d 54 (1978); People v. Cox,
61 A.D.2d 1035, 403 N.Y.S.2d 108 (2nd Dep't 1977); People v. Lindsay, 61 A.D.2d 992, 402
N.Y.S.2d 435 (2nd Dep't 1977); People v. Wilson, 60 A.D.2d 920, 401 N.Y.S.2d 576 (2nd
Dep't 1977); People v. Milano, 59 A.D.2d 852, 399 N.Y.S.2d 226 (1st Dep't 1977); People v.
Smoot, 59 A.D.2d 898, 399 N.Y.S.2d 133 (2nd Dep't 1977); People v. Hamlin, 58 A.D.2d 631,
395 N.Y.S.2d 679 (2nd Dep't 1977).
18. See, e.g., 68 A.D.2d 430, 417 N.Y.S.2d 681; 62 A.D.2d 715, 405 N.Y.S.2d 691. Con-
tra, 65 A.D.2d 405, 411 N.Y.S.2d 298; 59 A.D.2d 852, 399 N.Y.S.2d 226.
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the Second Department did not.1 9 The Court of Appeals decision
in Dawson settled this conflict among the Departments.
Richard Lee Dawson was arrested for sodomy, attempted rape,
robbery, grand larceny and assault in connection with a single inci-
dent in which he allegedly accosted a woman in a parking lot in
April, 1975, and then drove away in her car.20 Dawson's finger-
prints were found on the rearview mirror inside the car after it was
recovered. At trial the defendant denied having committed the
crimes charged and asserted that he had been at home babysitting
for his foster brothers on the afternoon of the assault. The alibi
was confirmed by both of the defendant's parents and an aunt.
Additionally, one of Dawson's friends testified that he had seen
Dawson and the victim together on at least one prior occasion.
This helped support the defendant's contention that he and the
victim had been friends for some time and to explain the presence
of the defendant's fingerprints inside the victim's car. Finally, a
garage attendant testified that the man he had seen driving away
in the victim's car on the day of the assault did not resemble the
defendant.
The Assistant District Attorney asked each witness on cross-
examination why they had not come forward prior to trial and
given this information to the police. The only objection to this line
of questioning preserved for appeal was in connection with the
questioning of the defendant's mother.21 The prosecutor asked her
if she ever made any attempt to contact the grand jury or the po-
lice to tell them her story. Defense counsel's objection to the ques-
tion was overruled and she replied that she had not.
19. See, e.g., 59 A.D.2d 898, 399 N.Y.S.2d 133; 58 A.D.2d 631, 395 N.Y.S.2d 679. But
see 64 A.D.2d 669, 407 N.Y.S.2d 236.
20. 50 N.Y.2d at 314-15, 406 N.E.2d at 773, 428 N.Y.S.2d at 916-17.
21. Objections were made to the Assistant District Attorney's questioning on cross-
examination on three occasions.
On one of these occasions, the court sustained the objection. Another time, the
court directed the District Attorney to rephrase the question before the witness
had the opportunity to respond. On neither of these occasions did defense coun-
sel request a curative instruction nor otherwise express any dissatisfaction with
the adequacy of the court's ruling. Consequently, these two objections were not
preserved for appellate review (CPL 470.05, subd. 2). It was only during the
cross-examination of the defendant's mother, Lydia Dawson, that defense coun-
sel's objection was overruled and the District Attorney was permitted to proceed
with his line of questioning.
50 N.Y.2d at 316, 406 N.E.2d at 774, 428 N.Y.S.2d at 917.
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There are three basic aspects to this issue: (1) whether a pros-
ecutor may ask when the witness became aware that he or she pos-
sessed exculpatory information; (2) whether a prosecutor may sug-
gest that the witness is under a duty to communicate the
exculpatory information in his possession to the authorities; and,
(3) whether the witness' failure to communicate this evidence to
the police has a legitimate bearing on his credibility.22 Courts gen-
erally agree on the answers to the first two of these questions.
A prosecutor may ask a witness when he became aware that he
possessed exculpatory information and to whom he related that in-
formation. This question is important in helping the jury deter-
mine whether the witness' testimony is truthful or of recent
fabrication. At the same time it does not infer that the witness is
unworthy of belief solely because of his failure to go to the authori-
ties. However, that impression is conveyed to the jury when the
prosecutor is allowed to suggest that the witness is under a duty to
communicate alibi information in his possession to the police or
district attorney. Since there is no legal duty for an alibi witness to
come forward, such questioning constitutes prosecutorial error.2 3
Moreover, where the witness testifies that he had disclosed his
knowledge to the defendant's attorney but had failed to inform the
prosecution, it is improper for the district attorney to imply that
the witness' testimony is unworthy of belief "simply because [that
person] had cooperated with defendant and his attorney and did
not divulge whatever information [he] possessed to law enforce-
ment authorities beforehand. '24 One judge has suggested an anal-
ogy to civil litigation where, he claims,
[i]t would not be supposed for a single moment ... that a witness for one
party, absent a special relationship to the other party, could be fairly im-
peached for failure to seek out the opposing party or that party's lawyer to
inform them of the evidence that the witness intends to give. 25
22. See Colarco, 68 A.D.2d at 435-40, 417 N.Y.S.2d at 683-87 (dissenting opinion of
Sandler, J.).
23. See, e.g., 65 A.D.2d 405, 411 N.Y.S.2d 298; 59 A.D.2d 898, 399 N.Y.S.2d 133; 58
A.D.2d 631, 395 N.Y.S.2d 679.
24. People v. Hamlin, 58 A.D.2d at 632, 395 N.Y.S.2d at 681.
25. 68 A.D.2d at 437, 417 N.Y.S.2d at 685 (dissenting opinion of Sandier, J.). Judge
Sandler has also suggested that it would be "preposterous" for a defendant's lawyer to im-
peach a prosecution witness for his failure to seek out and inform defense counsel of his
intended testimony prior to trial. Likewise, he contends, "[t]he same principle [should ap-
ply] with equal force in the reverse situation." Id. But see notes 37 & 39 infra.
[Vol. 30
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The main point of difference between the First and Second
Departments surrounds the third question: whether the witness'
failure to come forward with exculpatory information prior to trial
has a legitimate bearing on his credibility.26 The Court of Appeals
resolved this issue in Dawson, holding that such a failure to come
forward does have a bearing on the witness' credibility and should
be put before the jury, provided that certain procedural safeguards
are followed in order to minimize possible prejudice to the
defendant.
II. ARGUMENTS SUPPORTING SILENCE AS HAVING A LEGITIMATE
BEARING ON CREDIBILITY
A. Natural Tendency
The prosecution sought to establish that a witness' failure to
go to the authorities prior to trial was inconsistent with his later
exculpatory testimony at trial, and thus, subject to impeachment.
To establish this inconsistency, "the device commonly referred to
as impeachment by 'prior inconsistent statement' ,,28 was relied
upon. Silence in a situation where a jury might reasonably find it
"natural" for a witness to speak is a circumstance probative of a
witness' credibility or honesty and falls within the general rule of
26. Judge Sandler believes that usually it does not.
The principal purpose for this kind of cross-examination is to persuade the
jury that the testimony is not reliable because if it were truthful the witness
would have gone to the police and the District Attorney in an effort to obtain
the release of the arrested person or the dismissal of the charges. Although this
thesis has a superficial appeal, its fundamentally defective character becomes
immediately apparent upon analysis.
Take for example the situation of a parent or spouse of a defendant arrested
after being identified as the perpetrator of a crime or after a police officer has
reported that the defendant made an inculpatory statement. Would any knowl-
edgeable person seriously suppose that the District Attorney would dismiss the
charges upon being told by a close relative of the defendant that the defendant
was with the witness at the time the crime occurred? The answer is obvious. And
even if this highly improbable proposition were accepted as colorable, is there a
basis in normal experience for concluding that the witness would reasonably ex-
pect such a response sufficiently substantial to permit impeachment of the wit-
ness for failing to act upon such an expectation?
68 A.D.2d at 436, 417 N.Y.S.2d at 684-85.
27. These procedural safeguards include a foundation requirement prior to any such
questioning and certain cautionary comments which are discussed at text accompanying
notes 70-75 infra.
28. People v. Wise, 46 N.Y.2d 321, 385 N.E.2d 1262, 413 N.Y.S.2d 334 (1978).
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impeachment by prior inconsistent statements. This follows
because
[a] failure to assert a fact, when it would have been natural to assert it,
amounts in effect to an assertion of the non-existence of the fact. This is
conceded as a general principle of evidence. . . . There may be explanations,
indicating that the person had in truth no belief of that tenor; but the con-
duct is "prima facie" an inconsistency.
29
Following this line of reasoning, it is first necessary for the
prosecutor to establish that the witness failed to come forward
when it would have been "natural" for him to do so. He must, in
other words, establish a "threshold inconsistency" in the witness'
conduct before his silence may be used as an inconsistent state-
ment.30 If there was a duty for a witness to come forward to the
authorities whenever he possessed exculpatory information, the
burden of establishing this threshold inconsistency could easily be
met by simply showing that the witness did not come forward.
However, there is no such recognized legal duty.
3 1
In order to establish the necessary threshold inconsistency, the
prosecutor instead sought to rely upon the "natural tendency" of a
witness to exculpate a defendant.3 2 This theory may be summa-
rized: although a witness has no legal duty to come forward and
disclose whatever information he possesses to the authorities, it
would only seem natural for someone possessing exculpatory infor-
mation to come forward and disclose it to the authorities so that
an innocent defendant might be released. This inclination to come
forward should be particularly strong where the relationship be-
tween the defendant and the alibi witness is a close one. Hence, if
a witness fails to come forward when it would be natural for him to
do so, his conduct may be characterized as prima facie inconsistent
with his trial testimony and evidence of his pre-trial silence may
be used to impeach him.33
The prosecutor in Dawson first attempted to lay the necessary
foundation of knowledge of the charge against, and relationship to
29. 3 A J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 1042 (J. Chadbourne rev. ed. 1970).
30. The use of silence as an inconsistent statement was permitted in Wise.
31. See cases cited in note 23 supra.
32. Judge Silverman's dissent in Maschi notes the obvious motivation for the alibi wit-
ness to help his friend when he watches the police arrest him under an obvious misappre-
hension. 65 A.D.2d at 412, 413, 411-N.Y.S.2d at 302-03.
33. As to when it is, in fact, "natural" for the witness to come forward, see text accom-
panying notes 52-56 infra.
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the defendant which would permit the jury to find that it would
have been only natural for the witness to have come forward. This
was relatively easy since the witness in question was the defen-
dant's mother.
B. Other Arguments
In addition to this evidentiary analysis, the prosecutor also ad-
vanced two other reasons for allowing this type of questioning.
34
First, he suggested that if it is permissible for a defendant to cross-
examine a prosecution witness concerning his failure to come for-
ward with his story until just prior to trial, as occurred in Dawson,
it should be permissible for a prosecutor to similarly cross-examine
an alibi witness.3 5 This argument seems to ignore the fact that the
burdens of proof and production of evidence in a criminal case rest
solely with the prosecution s.3  Because the prosecution must prove
34. Another argument for allowing the prosecutor to impeach the credibility of an alibi
witness with evidence of his pre-trial silence was advanced in the dissent of Judge Martus-
cello in Hamlin, 58 A.D.2d at 632-34, 395 N.Y.S.2d at 681-83. This argument was based on
the New York notice of alibi statute (CPL 250.20 subd. 1). Judge Martuscello claimed that
"[i]mplicit in CPL 250.20 is the right of the prosecutor to question an alibi witness in order
to permit a thorough investigation of an alibi defense." 58 A.D.2d at 633, 395 N.Y.S.2d at
682. This argument was expressly rejected by the majority in Maschi. 65 A.D.2d at 409, 410,
411 N.Y.S.2d at 301.
35. The questioning of Mrs. Dawson, the defendant's mother, went as follows:
Q. Did you yourself ever go to the Grand Jury of the County of Monroe and tell
them the story you told us?
DEFENSE COUNSEL: Objection.
A. I don't know anything about the Grand Jury.
THE COURT: Just a minute.
DEFENSE COUNSEL: Objection, Your Honor. There is no legal responsibility
even for the defendant or for his mother to attend the grand jury proceedings.
DISTRICT ATTORNEY: I am not asking about legal responsibilities, all I am
asking is if she did go to the grand jury.
THE COURT: You may answer.
A. This is the first time I seen the grand jury. I don't know anything about the
grand jury.
Q. Did you ever go to the police and tell them this story that you told us about
your son's activities on April 15 1975?
A. I never talked to anybody about the thing.
Q. So today was the first time you really told your story?
A. I never got involved with the police or anything.
Record at 903-04, quoted in 50 N.Y.2d at 316-17, 406 N.E.2d at -774, 428 N.Y.S.2d 917-18.
36. See People v. Christman, 23 N.Y.2d 429, 244 N.E.2d 703, 297 N.Y.S.2d 134 (1969),
where the Court held that a defendant, since he is presumed to be innocent, has no obliga-
tion to lay out an alibi or to otherwise present exculpatory evidence. See also People v.
Travato, 309 N.Y. 382, 131 N.E.2d 557 (1955); People v. Felcone, 43 A.D.2d 976, 352
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the defendant guilty, it seems only reasonable for the defense to be
able to cross examine a prosecution witness who fails to come for-
ward until just prior to trial to determine the reasons for his si-
lence. Certainly there is no comparable concern with prejudice to
the prosecution's case as there is to the defendant's case when his
alibi Witness is similarly questioned.3 7 Without this countervailing
consideration, there is no sound reason to prohibit the defendant
from so questioning a prosecution witness in order to put valuable
information, the witness' reasons for not coming forward at an ear-
lier time, before the jury.
The second additional argument presented by the prosecution
was that, while an alibi Witness has no legal duty to come forward
to the police or district attorney prior to trial, a witness does have
a civic obligation to communicate any information he may have
concerning the commission of a crime to the authorities.38 This
would include exculpatory as well as inculpatory information.3
N.Y.S.2d 499 (2nd Dep't 1974); People v. Muniz, 40 A.D.2d 985, 338 N.Y.S.2d 220 (2nd
Dep't 1972).
37. As a consequence of the prosecution's burden of having to prove the defendant
guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, any evidence which would tend to exculpate the defen-
dant should be put before the jury. The question of how much weight this evidence should
receive is a question for the jury. Evidence of the prosecution's witness' failure to approach
the authorities until a short time before trial may be enough to create a reasonable doubt as
to the defendant's guilt. Defense counsel, of course, may not infer that the prosecution wit-
ness is lying simply because of his failure to come forward at an earlier time.
38. In particular, the prosecutor relied upon Commonwealth v. Downer, 159 Pa. Super.
626, 49 A.2d 516 (1946), to support the argument that the lack of duty to come forward is
irrelevant to the inquiry at hand.
[T]he matter is not a question of duty. Frequently a witness testifying to an alibi
is asked to name the person to whom he first related the events testified to. This
is always competent. It is common experience that in all sorts of trials witnesses
are asked to name the person to whom they first told that they had seen the acts
or heard the matters to which they testified. In criminal trials the defendant's
witnesses are usually asked why they did not report what they purported to hear
or see to the police officers. Such cross-examination is proper and the admissibil-
ity does not depend upon any duty to speak or report to the police officers; but
the fact that the witness did not, may, in some degree, shed light on the believ-
ability of the testimony.
Id. at 519. See also Commonwealth v. Duffy, 238 Pa. Super. 161, 353 A.2d 50, 58 (1975). The
prosecution also cited Judge Cardozo's notion of "justice of the state" to support its argu-
ment that the witness has a civic obligation to come forward when he possesses information
concerning crime. See In Re Babington v. Yellow Taxi Corp., 250 N.Y. 14, 17, 164 N.E. 726
(1928).
39. The prosecution claimed that this civic obligation to communicate either inculpa-
tory or exculpatory information to the authorities should lead to a rejection of Judge San-
dler's assertion in Colarco that it would be "preposterous" in a civil case for a lawyer to
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Thus, whether or not the alibi witness has a legal duty to come
forward is irrelevant to the issue at hand-whether the witness is
to be found credible in light of his failure to come forward. 0 This
argument seems to be wholly without merit. It doesn't really focus
on the credibility of the witness, rather, it only looks to whether
the witness chose to help the authorities instead of the defendant.
Moreover, if this argument was accepted, a witness' failure to con-
tact the authorities when he possessed exculpatory evidence could
be used to impeach his subsequent alibi testimony at trial even if
the witness had good reason not to come forward prior to trial.41
III. ARGUMENTS AGAINST ALLOWING IMPEACHMENT
The primary argument advanced by the defense against per-
mitting impeachment was that neither a defendant 42 nor any of his
witnesses43 has a legal obligation to volunteer exculpatory evidence
to the authorities. Thus, the failure of an alibi witness to go to the
authorities prior to trial cannot be described as inconsistent with
his later exculpatory testimony at trial. "Before a witness can be
impeached based on his prior silence, it must be shown that he had
a duty to speak on a prior occasion, but remained silent.
4"
Another argument presented by the defense was that the alibi
witness might "reasonably presume that it was-sufficient for him to-
relate his knowledge to the attorney retained or appointed to re-
present the accused. '45 In this case, on redirect examination, Mrs.
Dawson, the defendant's alibi witness, explained that she had con-
sulted with the defense counsel prior to trial.46 Therefore, if she
impeach an opposing witness with his pre-trial silence and that, himilarly, it should be "pre-
posterous" to claim that a defense witness may be so impeached in a criminal case.
40. See notes 26 & 27 supra.
41. A good example of the possible prejudice that could accrue to a defendant if this
were the applicable standard would be the situation where the alibi witness was also a sus-
pected, but yet unindicted, accomplice of the defendant. Even though the witness would
have every reason for noi coming forward (and thus avoid potentially incriminating him-
self), he could still be impeached if he were to wait and offer alibi testimony at trial. See
Shadd v. United States, 423 F.2d 511 (3rd Cir. 1971), and text accompanying notes 71-74
infra.
42. See cases cited in note 36 supra.
43. See People v. Hamlin, 58 A.D.2d 631, 395 N.Y.S.2d 679; People v. Smoot, 59 A.D.2d
898, 399 N.Y.S.2d 133.
44. 64 A.D.2d at 671, 407 N.Y.S.2d 239 (concurring opinion of Titone, J.).
45. 58 A.D.2d at 632, 395 N.Y.S.2d at 681.
46. Record at 907-11.
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reasonably believed that going to her son's attorney was sufficient,
her failure to contact the authorities could not be described as in-
consistent with her trial testimony. 7
The final reasoning for prohibiting this type of questioning
would be its inherently prejudicial effect on the defendant's case.
By implying that the alibi witness breached a non-existent duty to
come forward to the authorities prior to trial, the prosecutor may
falsely create the impression that the witness is generally unworthy
of belief.
48
IV. COURT OF APPEALS ANALYSIS OF THE ISSUE IN People v.
Dawson
The Court of Appeals concluded in Dawson that although a
witness ordinarily has no duty to come forward to the authorities
prior to trial and disclose information, failure to do so may be used
to impeach later testimony in certain limited circumstances. Prior
to any impeachment, the prosecutor must first lay a proper foun-
dation for his questioning. Further, the Court included three cau-
tionary comments which were designed to minimize confusion and
avoid future prejudicial error.
The opinion states that a threshold inconsistency in the wit-
ness' conduct may be used to impeach his testimony. The Court
determined that, where he has reason to come forward, an alibi
witness' pre-trial silence is of sufficient probative value to be con-
sidered inconsistent with any later exculpatory testimony at trial.
This establishes the necessary threshold inconsistency in the wit-
ness' conduct needed for impeachment. 49 In order to determine
47. In United States v. Young, 463 F.2d 934 (D.C. Cir. 1972), an alibi witness was ques-
tioned regarding his failure to come forward with his alibi testimony prior to trial. The court
noted that the witness "must have had a conference with defendant's attorney," Id. at 938
n.4, and concluded that the witness "might reasonably presume that it was sufficient for him
to relate his knowledge to the [defendant's] attorney . . . ." Id. at 938. Thus, the witness'
trial testimony could not be characterized as inconsistent with his prior silence. Accordingly,
the court stated that "no inference can be drawn from the fact that a witness did not go to
the police when he learns that they have made an arrest of a defendant for a crime at a time
for which he can provide alibi testimony." Id. at 938. It should be noted that the Young
court did not find the prosecutor's improper questioning to be so prejudicial as to require a
new trial.
48. The Second Department held in Hamlin that such a "false suggestion of impropri-
ety has no place in our system of jurisprudence and should not be tolerated." 58 A.D.2d 632,
395 N.Y.S.2d at 681.
49. This essentially adopts the evidentiary test derived from Hale.
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whether the witness has sufficient reason to come forward, the
Court adopted the "natural tendency" test.50 Hence, threshold in-
consistency can be demonstrated by showing that it would have
been natural for the witness to come forward prior to trial. This
finding shifts the burden of explaining away apparent inconsisten-
cies in his conduct to the witness.
The Court went on to distinguish the "natural tendency" con-
cept from the "duty to speak" requirement rejected in the defense
analysis.51 It concluded that "the notion that a defendant in cus-
tody is under 'no duty to speak' was really only another way of
saying that it is neither natural nor expected that he should speak
when faced with his accusers and that, therefore, his silence in that
context has no probative worth. '52 In other words, if it would have
seemed natural for the witness to come forward to the authorities
prior to trial, his failure to do so would be prima facie inconsistent
with his later alibi testimony given at trial, even though he was
under no legal duty to come forward. Since it would certainly seem
natural in Dawson for the witness, the defendant's mother, to
come forward and "forestall the mistaken prosecution of a loved
one,"' 53 the witness' conduct is inconsistent and may be used to im-
peach her testimony.
The Court explained what would constitute a proper founda-
tion for questioning. The district attorney must demonstrate that
the "witness was aware of the nature of the charges pending
A basic rule of evidence provides that prior inconsistent statements may be used
to impeach the credibility of a witness. As a preliminary matter, however, the
court must be persuaded that the statements are indeed inconsistent. If the gov-
ernment fails to establish a threshold inconsistency between silence . . .and
later exculpatory testimony at trial, proof of silence lacks any significant proba-
tive value and must therefore be excluded.
422 U.S. at 176 [citations omitted].
50. See note 32 supra.
51. The term "duty to speak" was originally used in People v. Rutigliano, 261 N.Y. 103,
184 N.E. 689 (1933), to counter a belief advanced in earlier cases, principal among them,
Kelly v. People, 55 N.Y. 565 (1874), that it was proper for a defendant to speak when con-
fronted with evidence of his guilt and that his failure to speak in such circumstances is "but
an implied acquiescence in the truth of the statements made by others, and thus presump-
tive evidence of guilt." 55 N.Y. at 571.
52. 50 N.Y.2d at 320, 406 N.E.2d at 777, 428 N.Y.S.2d at 920. Cf. People v. Rothschild,
35 N.Y.2d 355, 360-61, 320 N.E.2d 639, 642, 361 N.Y.S.2d 901, 905 (1974) (where Court
found that it would have been "natural" for defendant, a police officer, "to promptly report
any bribe or attempted bribe to his superiors").
53. 50 N.Y.2d at 318, 406 N.E.2d at 775, 428 N.Y.S.2d at 919.
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against the defendant, had reason to recognize that he possessed
exculpatory information, had a reasonable motive for acting to ex-
onerate the defendant, and, finally, was familiar with the means to
make such information available to law enforcement authorities. '4
The purpose of requiring this foundation is to make sure all rele-
vant testimony is put before the jury and to enable the witness to
explain any discrepancies between his prior silence and his trial
testimony.5 5 The requirement is essential to establish that the wit-
ness should have naturally come forward to the authorities prior to
trial. Without such a requirement a "natural tendency" presump-
tion would be clearly unreasonable.
With this requirement, a "natural tendency" presumption
seems to be a sound way of both putting potentially relevant infor-
mation before the jury and protecting the defendant from being
unjustly prejudiced. Where the prosecutor cannot establish the
necessary foundation requirements he will be precluded from ques-
tioning the witness about his failure to come forward. Moreover,
even where the proper foundation is laid and the "natural ten-
dency" presumption established, the witness may still be able to
rebut the presumption, particularly on redirect examination. Most
importantly, discovering the motivations behind a witness' decision
for not disclosing what he knows to the authorities will undoubt-
edly enable the jury to better evaluate the witness' credibility. 0
Thus, while it may seem artificial to say that a witness has no duty
to come forward but that he may be impeached if he fails to do so
when it would have been natural for him to, the distinction is
nonetheless a valid one.
Having established the requisite inconsistency in the witness'
testimony for impeachment purposes, the Court' next questioned
whether the probative value of the witness' silence outweighs any
prejudicial effect that may be attributable to such questioning.
This was also the second inquiry made by the Supreme Court in
Hale.57 The potential prejudicial effect to a defendant when an al-
54. 50 N.Y.2d at 318 n.4, 406 N.E.2d at 777 n.4, 428 N.Y.S.2d at 914 n.4.
55. For a general discussion of the purpose of a foundation requirement, see Comment,
Impeachment By Inconsistent Statements: California Theory and Practice, 9 U. CALIF.,
DAvis L. REv. 285, 311 (1976).
56. This may be accomplished without inferring that the witness was doing anything
legally or morally wrong in not coming forward prior to trial.
57. For a discussion of the low probative value of a defendant's pre-trial silence and its
potential for prejudice, see note 13 supra.
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ibi witness is confronted with his pre-trial silence is the possibility
that a jury may infer that the witness was necessarily lying if he
failed to come forward prior to trial. Considering the close interre-
lationship between a jury's believing the alibi and its subsequent
decision of guilt or innocence, this possibly unjustified inference
drawn by the jury deprives the defendant of a fair trial and consti-
tutes a violation of his due process rights.58
In determining the probative value of the defendant's silence
in Hale, the majority looked to alternative explanations for the de-
fendant's silence. These could include a belief by the defendant
that any explanation he might make would not influence the police
to release him, prior police contact59 and, most importantly, reli-
ance on Miranda warnings.6 0 The Supreme Court found that in
light of these alternative explanations the probative value of the
defendant's silence was not sufficient to overcome its potentially
prejudicial effect, and, therefore, evidence of the defendant's pre-
trial silence was excluded. 1
In Dawson, the Court similarly analyzed possible explanations
for the witness' silence and then went on to weigh the probative
value of the silence, in light of these explanations, against potential
prejudicial effect to determine whether the evidence should be ad-
mitted.2 The Court found that several explanations which could
account for a witness' silence, including: fear or mistrust of the au-
thorities; a belief that his efforts would be of little or no avail in
getting the defendant released; and, because of instructions from
58. It has consistently been held to be reversible error for a judge to charge a jury that
it could draw an inference of guilt from its disbelief of the alibi witness. See, e.g., People v.
Sowell, 75 A.D.2d 608, 426 N.Y.S.2d 828 (2nd Dep't 1980); People v. Lee, 57 A.D.2d 905, 394
N.Y.S.2d 457 (2nd Dep't 1977); People v. Perez, 54 A.D.2d 742, 387 N.Y.S.2d 655 (2nd Dep't
1976); People v. Cright, 47 A.D.2d 906, 366 N.Y.S.2d 218 (2nd Dep't 1975); People v.
Leasure, 43 A.D.2d 688, 312 N.Y.S.2d 563 (2nd Dep't 1970).
59. 422 U.S. at 180.
60. Id. at 177.
61. Id. at 180, 181. The Court of Appeals used this evidentiary framework as an alter-
native basis for its holding in People v. Conyers, 49 N.Y.2d 174, 400 N.E.2d 342, 424
N.Y.S.2d 402 (1980). In Conyers the Court held that a defendant's silence at or after the
time of his arrest may not be used by the prosecution to impeach his exculpatory testimony
at trial. Although the Court's decision was based on the principles of due process enunciated
in Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610, the Court stressed as an alternative rationale that evidence
of a defendant's silence at the time of his arrest is of such low probative value, due to the
many possible explanations for it, as to be outweighed by its prejudicial effect. 49 N.Y.2d at
181, 400 N.E.2d at 347, 424 N.Y.S.2d at 407.
62. 50 N.Y.2d at 321, 406 N.E.2d at 777, 428 N.Y.S.2d at 921-22.
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the defendant's attorney. These reasons, however, were not found
to be significant enough to justify a per se rule prohibiting the in-
troduction of the witness' silence in order to impeach his
testimony. 3
The Court expressed the belief that the witness' pre-trial si-
lence may be very probative of his credibility, and that it is gener-
ally much more probative than a defendant's post-arrest silence.
This is because the silence of the defendant is seen as always being
inherently ambiguous. "The innocent suspect, as well as the guilty,
is free to refrain from discussing . . . his case with an arresting
officer."'64 However, this is not true with regard to the probative-
ness of the witness' silence, particularly since the witness "may
have no personal stake in remaining silent and. . . may well have
a personal interest in speaking up in order to aid the defendant."65
Thus, the prejudicial effect to a defendant is seen as being less
where the witness is questioned about his silence than where the
defendant is so questioned. 6 While this assertion is probably true,
it should not be used to underrate the importance of the inferences
drawn from the silence of an alibi witness. As mentioned before,
17
the believability of an alibi witness may have a considerable im-
pact on the jury's final decision. Additionally, the probative value
of the witness' silence may be minimal in some instances.6 8 There-
fore, it seems that the Court places too much emphasis on this dis-
tinction as a basis for allowing impeachment of the witness.
Admission of this evidence was primarily seen as a means of
allowing the jury to assess the truthfulness of the alibi.69 The
63. 50 N.Y.2d at 321-22, 406 N.E.2d at 777-78, 428 N.Y.S.2d at 921.
64. 49 N.Y.2d at 181, 400 N.E.2d at 347, 424 N.Y.S.2d at 407.
65. 50 N.Y.2d at 321, 406 N.E.2d at 777, 428 N.Y.S.2d at 921.
66. Id. This conclusion is based on both the lack of inherent ambiguity in the witness'
silence and its potentially greater probative value.
67. See text accompanying notes 57-58 & n.58 supra.
68. This is particularly true in the Shadd-type situation discussed in note 41 supra. See
text accompanying notes 84-87 infra.
69. The Court stated that,
As is true in any instance in which impeachment evidence is offered, the trier of
fact may reasonably be expected to weigh the available information and deter-
mine for itself whether the witness' trial testimony is consistent with his prior
behavior and assertions. Just as we have recognized that there are a variety of
factors which may account for the witness' prior silence, the average juror may
be expected to discern the existence of the same factors and credit or discount
the witness' testimony in accordance with his perceptions.
50 N.Y.2d at 332, 406 N.E.2d at 778, 428 N.Y.2d at 921.
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Court seems to conclude that, whatever the risk of prejudice in-
volved here, it is worth the attempt to determine whether the wit-
ness' testimony is truthful or only a recent fabrication.
In order to minimize prejudicing the defendant's right to a fair
trial, the Court included several procedural safeguards in the form
of cautionary comments. The first comment calls for the trial judge
to exercise his sound discretion to prevent the jury from being mis-
led by the prosecutor's attempts to impeach the credibility of the
alibi witness. This seems to be directed at the attempts of some
prosecutors70 to imply that any witness who fails to go to the au-
thorities is of a flawed moral character or generally unworthy of
belief. Thus, the trial judge should be ready to instruct the jury
that the witness has no legal duty to approach the authorities and
that his testimony should not be discounted solely because of his
failure to come forward.
The second comment specifically states that the trial judge
should, upon request, instruct the jury that the witness has no
civic or moral obligation71 to volunteer exculpatory information to
the authorities prior to trial and that the jury should consider the
witness' failure to come forward only as it appears to be inconsis-
tent with his trial testimony. This instruction calls for the jury to
concern itself with evaluating the reasons given by the witness for
his failure to come forward to determine whether they are in fact
consistent with the "natural tendency" of the witness to exculpate
the defendant.
Finally, the third comment calls for the trial judge to call a
bench conference when questioning regarding impeachment begins
to determine whether the witness refrained from coming forward
under the advice of the defense counsel. Comment or questioning
by the prosecutor on the issues of why a witness failed to come
forward after being advised not to could well result in a mistrial.
7 2
70. Particularly in the earlier cited Second Department cases such as People v. Hamlin,
58 A.D.2d 631, 395 N.Y.S.2d 679, and People v. Smoot, 59 A.D.2d 898, 399 N.Y.S.2d 133.
71. Thus, the Court of Appeals explicitly rejected the "civic obligation" argument
presented by the prosecution. See text accompanying notes 38-41 supra.
72. In People v. Conrow, 200 N.Y. 356 (1911), the Court held that where a defendant
was advised by counsel to refrain from speaking to the authorities, his subsequent silence
may not be used against him at trial. The Trial Court, at the close of testimony, struck the
testimony of the defendant in response to questions concerning his failure to speak with the
authorities since "he was strictly within his legal rights when he said that he would not say
anything by advice of counsel." 200 N.Y. at 367. The Court of Appeals nonetheless reversed
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Thus, after eliciting when the witness was asked to remain silent
by the defendant's attorney, the prosecutor would be limited to
asking the witness why he did not disclose his information any
sooner to the defendant's attorney, and not why he failed to dis-
close it to the authorities.
In general, these three comments seem to indicate that suit-
able restrictions should be placed upon the prosecutor to prohibit
him from using this form of cross-examination to unfairly malign
the defendant and his witnesses. These explanatory instructions
should help alleviate confusion and focus the jury's inquiry on the
witness' credibility.
Finally, the Court commented on the district attorney's duty
"to conduct the trial in a manner consistent with the defendant's
due process rights. '73 In Dawson, the Assistant District Attorney
questioned the alibi witness about her failure to tell the Grand
Jury about what she knew, when in fact she had no legal right to
have her testimony heard by a Grand Jury. 4 Such questioning was
found to be improper and not in keeping with the District Attor-
ney's obligation to act in good faith.75
V. RELATED DECISIONS IN OTHER JURISDICTIONS
The question of whether a witness' pre-trial silence may be
used to impeach his later alibi testimony at trial has not been fre-
quently litigated outside of New York. Most state and federal
courts have, however, generally held such questioning to be
permissible.
Illinois courts have focused on the question of whether the
witness had an opportunity to come forward prior to trial. If the
the subsequent conviction of the defendant and ordered a new trial because of serious
prejudice to the defendant which was caused by the introduction of these statements, The
Court in Dawson extended this rationale to include alibi witnesses who have remained silent
prior to trial on advice of the defendant's counsel. 50 N.Y.2d at 323, 406 N.E,2d at 778, 428
N.Y.S.2d at 922.
73. 50 N.Y.2d at 323, 406 N.E.2d at 778, 428 N.Y.S.2d at 922.
74. Id. See New York CPL § 190.50 subd. 1.
75. Judge Wachtler added a concurring opinion which dealt almost exclusively with the
applicability of the decision in the situation where, as here, the alibi witness fails to volunta-
rily appear before a Grand Jury investigating the crime in question. More generally he
noted that "[a]lthough. . .prosecution inquiry on this point often poses a risk to the defen-
dant's right to a fair trial, it would appear that the potential for abuse will be avoided if the
restrictions imposed by the court are carefully observed in future cases." 50 N.Y.2d at 325.
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witness had such an opportunity and failed to come forward, he
may be impeached. Illinois courts have also held that an alibi
witness may be impeached where he had reason to come forward
prior to trial.7 In both situations the courts have reasoned that
since the witness always remains free to explain away any apparent
inconsistencies in his conduct, the prosecutor should be permitted
to put this information before the jury.78 These Illinois decisions
have, however, failed to consider the prejudicial effect that such
questioning has on the defendant.7 9 This factor seems to be the
principal difference between the Illinois courts' analysis and the
Dawson decision.
Courts in both Michigan 0 and New Jersey81 have, like New
York, also recognized "natural tendency"-type theories of their
own to uphold the cross-examination of alibi witnesses in regard to
their pre-trial silence. Although neither court expressly mandated
a foundation requirement for such questioning, both of the alibi
76. In People v. McMath, 104 Ill. App.2d 302, 244 N.E.2d 330 (1968), the court upheld
the impeachment of an alibi witness where the witness was in contact with the police imme-
diately after they arrived to investigate the crime for which the defendant was arrested and
failed to disclose his exculpatory information. Impeachment was also allowed in People v.
Van Zile, 48 Ill. App.3d 972, 363 N.E.2d 429 (1977), where the defendant's witnesses refused
to talk with the state's investigators prior to trial.
* 77., In People v. Kester, 78 Ill. App.3d 902, 397 N.E.2d 888 (1979), impeachment of
family members of the defendant was allowed where they had made no effort to come for-
ward while the defendant was spending some six weeks in jail. It seems as though impeach-
ment of the witnesses was allowed because the court found it would have been natural for
them to come forward if their alibi testimony were, in fact, truthful.
78. In People v. Van Zile, 48 Ill. App.3d 972, 363 N.E.2d 429, the court stated that a
witness declines to be interviewed "at the risk that he may be asked later at trial about such
fact and his reasons therefore. Perhaps it can be explained away, but it is nonetheless still a
risk." Id. at 978, 363 N.E.2d at 434. Thus, the burden of explaining away any inconsistencies
in his conduct is put upon the witness.
79. It should be noted that People v. McMath, 104 Ill. App.2d 302, 244 N.E.2d 330, was
decided prior to Hale and that this could account for the failure of that court to analyze the
factor of prejudice since it seems that only after Hale was prejudice emphasized as a promi-
nent factor in determining whether evidence of pre-trial silence should be admitted. Fur-
ther, both Van Zile, 48 Ill. App.3d 972, 363 N.E.2d 429, and Kester, 78 Ill. App.3d 902, 397
N.E.2d 888, relied principally upon McMath in holding impeachment to be proper.
80. The Michigan Court of Appeals held in People v. McClow, 40 Mich. App. 185, 198
N.W.2d 707 (1972), that "the credibility of a witness may be attacked by showing that he
failed to speak or act when it would have been natural to do so if the facts were in accor-
dance with his testimony." Id. at 193, 198 N.W.2d at 712.
81. The Superior Court of New Jersey held in State v. Plowden, 126 N.J. Super. 228,
313 A.2d 802 (1974), that the witness, the defendant's sister, may be impeached where her
conduct was inconsistent "with what one could reasonably expect she would have done had
defendant been in her apartment when the shootings occurred." Id. at 230, 313 A.2d at 803.
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witnesses involved in these two cases were close relatives of the
defendants,8 2 and so the usual requirements of establishing a rela-
tionship with the defendant and knowledge of the charge pending
against him would seem to be satisfied here. As in Illinois, poten-
tial prejudice to the defendant is not discussed by either court.8
Of all the decisions allowing impeachment of alibi witnesses
through the use of their pre-trial silence, the only clearly erroneous
rationale would seem to be that of the Third Circuit Court of Ap-
peals in Shadd v. United States.4 There the alibi witness was a
suspected accomplice of the defendant and had elected to exercise
his personal fifth amendment right to remain silent. The witness
was subsequently impeached at trial by virtue of his earlier silence.
The court stated that "even if the impeachment of the witness...
somehow did violate the witness' personal fifth amendment rights,
petitioner Shadd may not claim it as an error."8 Here, there was
obviously no inconsistency between the witness' remaining silent
prior to trial and his later alibi testimony at trial since his silence
was based on his desire to avoid incriminating himself. His silence
was of extremely low probative worth due to its inherent ambigu-
ity86 and, therefore, should not have been commented upon by the
prosecutor.
Along with the District of Columbia Court of Appeals decision
in United States v. Young,8 7 the only other decision to prohibit the
impeachment of an alibi witness with the evidence of his pre-trial
silence was that same court's decision in United States v. Huff.88
The issue there arose in a slightly different context. The court held
that a prosecutor may not impeach a defense witness by eliciting
82. The alibi witness in People v. McClow, 40 Mich. App. 185, 198 N.W.2d 707, was the
defendant's brother.
83. Other states which have generally allowed alibi witnesses to be impeached with
their pre-trial silence include: .Pennsylvania (see Commonwealth v. Downer, 159 Pa. Super.
626, 49 A.2d 516; Commonwealth v. Duffy, 238 Pa. Super. 161, 353 A.2d 50), Wisconsin (see
McLemore v. State, 87 Wis. 2d 739, 275 N.W.2d 692 (1979)), and, Georgia (see State v.
Head, 235 Ga. 677, 221 S.E.2d 435 (1975)).
84. 423 F.2d 511 (3rd Cir. 1977).
85. Id. at 514. For a decision which relied upon the reasoning advanced in Shadd, see
McLemore v. State, 87 Wis. 2d 739, 275 N.W.2d 692.
86. The witness' silence in this case was ambiguous in the same way that a defendant's
pre-trial silence is ambiguous-he failed to come forward with his story prior to trial for fear
of incriminating himself.
87. 463 F.2d 934. For a discussion of the Young decision, see note 47 supra.
88. 442 F.2d 885 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
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from him that he did not testify at the defendant's preliminary
hearing.
In our view the law does not permit a prosecutor to argue a claim of a recent
fabrication solely on the failure of the defense witness to testify at the pre-
liminary hearing. To use this as a ground for asking whether the witness tes-
tified at the preliminary hearing is to permit a question which has little, if
any, materiality but has a potential for unfair prejudice.8 9
The prosecution may, however, "inquire as to whether the defense
witness disclosed his knowledge under circumstances where that
would have been natural and expected." 90 This statement seems
very similar to the New York Court of Appeals "natural tendency"
concept. Again, as in Young, what is lacking in Huff is a threshold
inconsistency since the witness had gone to the defendant's lawyer
and was simply not called upon to testify at the preliminary hear-
ing. Since it was natural for the witness to disclose what informa-
tion he possessed to the defendant's lawyer, it would be improper
for the prosecutor to comment upon the witness' failure to come
forward to the authorities prior to trial. This situation would also
be analogous to the witness' refraining from speaking prior to trial
on the advice of counsel and would, by virtue of the final caution-
ary comment in Dawson, be improper in New York. It is significant
to note that Huff is the only decision to give ample consideration
to the possible prejudicial effect that this sort of questioning may
have upon the defendant. This fact, along with the ultimate recog-
nition that a witness may not always be impeached with his pre-
trial silence, makes the Huff court's analysis the closest to that of
the Court of Appeals in Dawson.
CONCLUSION
While recognizing that impeaching an alibi witness with evi-
dence of his pre-trial silence may be extremely prejudicial to the
defendant, it appears that the Court of Appeals has determined
that the desirability of putting the witness' credibility before the
jury will outweigh any potential prejudice to the defendant. Addi-
tionally, the Court seems to believe that the procedural safeguards
outlined in the opinion will serve to minimize any risk of




prejudice. 91 While these assumptions seem, generally, to be valid,
particular aid exacting attention must be devoted to the effective
implementation of the procedural safeguards listed in the opinion
in order to insure that the defendant will receive a fair trial.
Being able to show that the witness should have naturally
come forward prior to trial opens the way for his subsequent im-
peachment and thus is the cornerstone of the Court's opinion. One
possible modification of this "natural tendency" concept would be
to reformulate it in terms which do not overly emphasize going to
the authorities, but rather the witness' desire to have the defen-
dant exonerated. Thus, for example, the witness' testimony at trial
would not be considered inconsistent with his prior conduct if he
disclosed his information to a third party whom he believed would
be able to aid the defendant. Principally, this would be an attor-
ney, as in Young.9 2 Thus, whenever a witness went to disclose his
knowledge to an attorney, whether advised to remain silent or not,
his subsequent silence would be considered consistent with his de-
sire to exculpate the defendant. Because the purpose of Dawson is
not to compel potential witnesses to come forward to the authori-
ties, but rather to identify fabricated alibis, this adoption of the
Young rationale would protect those who chose not to go to the
police, for one reason or another, from having their later conduct
characterized as inconsistent with their trial testimony.93 Since the
prosecutor may still inquire as to when and to whom the alibi was
originally disclosed, the jury would still be able to determine if the
alibi was only recently concocted or whether it was disclosed some
time ago.
Three decisions since Dawson have emphasized the necessity
for strict adherence to the procedural safeguards outlined in that
opinion. In People v. Burgos94 the Court of Appeals held that it
was error for the trial judge to refuse to advise the jury that the
defendant's alibi witnesses were under no duty to volunteer excul-
patory information to law enforcement authorities. A second deci-
91. See text accompanying notes 70-73 supra.
92. See note 47 supra. Among others, this third party could also be a member of the
clergy or even a member of the defendant's immediate family.
93. Thus, the witness could not be impeached due to the lack of any threshold inconsis-
tency in his conduct. This basis for prohibiting impeachment should be distinguished from
the Dawson court's third cautionary comment which would prohibit the impeachment of an
alibi witness who remained silent on the advice of defendant's counsel. See note 72 supra.
94. 50 N.Y.2d 992, 409 N.E.2d 947, 431 N.Y.S.2d 474 (1980).
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sion95 by the Second Department also held that the prosecutor's
failure to lay a proper foundation as well as his attempt to suggest
that the witness was lying because he failed to come forward prior
to trial was reversible error. Finally, in People v. Payne9" the Court
of Appeals found that "nothing in the content or manner of cross
examination ... suggested or implied that the witness was under
any duty to go to the police or District Attorney, '9 7 and, accord-
ingly, the cross examination of the defendant's alibi witness con-
cerning his failure to come forward prior to trial was found to be
proper.
These recent cases demonstrate that the procedural safeguards
outlined in Dawson are both workable and useful in helping to
minimize the possibility that the defendant's right to a fair trial
will be prejudiced.
BRIAN T. EDWARDS
95. People v. Maschi, 76 A.D.2d 808, 403 N.E.2d 449, 429 N.Y.S.2d 662 (2nd Dep't
1980).
96. 50 N.Y.2d 867, 407 N.E.2d 1339, 430 N.Y.S.2d 42 (1980).
97. 50 N.Y.2d at 868, 407 N.E.2d at 1339, 430 N.Y.S.2d at 43.
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